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THE EFFECT OF MARKETING COOPERATIVES ON COST-REDUCING 
PROCESS INNOVATION ACTIVITY 
 
Abstract - This paper examines the market and welfare effects of cooperative involvement in cost-
reducing process innovation activity in the context of a mixed oligopsony where an open-membership 
marketing co-op competes with an IOF. The presence of the marketing co-op is shown to result in 
increased producer prices and welfare gains for all farmers, members and non-members of the co-op. The 
effect of the marketing co-op on process innovation activity depends on the relative quality of its final 
products, the degree of producer heterogeneity, and the size of innovation costs.  
 
Keywords: cooperatives, process innovation, mixed oligopsony, retained earnings. 
 
 
Cooperative organizations constitute an integral part of the increasingly industrialized agri-food system 
accounting for 25% to 30% of total farm supply and marketing expenditures (USDA, 2003). When 
compared to profit-maximizing investor-owned firms (IOFs), a distinguishing feature of cooperatives (co-
ops) is that the owners are also the users of the services provided by the organization (USDA, 1995; 
Hansmann, 1996). With members as both owners and users of its services, a co-op is typically assumed to 
focus on maximizing member welfare rather than profits.  
The economic ramifications of the different objective function of the cooperative organization 
have received considerable attention in the relevant literature with the main focus being on the effect of 
different types of co-ops on the equilibrium conditions of various Cournot and Bertrand mixed market 
settings [see Sexton and Sexton (1987), Cotterill (1987), Sexton (1990), Tennbakk (1995), Albaek and 
Schultz (1998), Fulton and Giannakas (2001), Karantininis and Zago (2001)]. A key result of this 
literature is that the presence of co-ops results in more competitive conduct and increased welfare. 
Being an integral part of the industrialized agri-food system, many co-ops have responded to the 
pressures of the increasingly competitive market place by trying to position themselves via their R&D 
activities. Important examples include Limagrain, Cebeco, and Cosun in Europe, while co-ops in the U.S. 
such as Ocean Spray have had substantial innovation activity.  
Recognizing the increased cooperative involvement in R&D, Giannakas and Fulton (2005) (G&F, 
hereafter) examined the market and welfare effects of the involvement of input supplying co-ops in cost- 
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reducing, process innovation activity. G&F show that the presence of the cooperative organization in an 
oligopolistic agricultural input market (i) can increase total process innovation activity and (ii) enhances 
economic welfare by reducing the prices of agricultural inputs.  
An important feature of the input-supply co-ops studied in G&F is that they constitute a backward 
integration of their members – i.e., they are formed by agricultural producers to produce inputs (such as 
seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides etc.) used in agricultural production. Thus, the members/owners of 
an input supply co-op are part of the demand side of the co-op’s market as they buy the product supplied 
by the co-op.   
Unlike supply co-ops that constitute a backward integration of their members, the other important 
type of cooperative organizations, the marketing co-ops, constitute a forward integration of their 
members. In particular, marketing co-ops are formed by producers to process and market the agricultural 
produce of their members. Thus, the members/owners of a marketing co-op are part of the supply side of 
the co-op’s market as they supply the co-op with an input in its production process.     
Given the prevalence of these fundamentally different types of cooperative organizations, the 
question that naturally arises is “Does the type of cooperative organization matter when considering the 
market and welfare effects of cooperative involvement in innovation activity?” This paper will try to 
answer this question by determining the effects of the involvement of marketing co-ops in process 
innovation activity and comparing the results with those of G&F.  
In particular, this paper examines the market and welfare effects of the involvement of marketing 
co-ops in cost-reducing process innovation activity in the agri-food system. The paper analyzes the 
consequences of cooperative involvement for the amount of process innovation, the pricing behavior of 
firms, and social welfare in the context of a mixed duopsony where an open-membership marketing co-op 
and an IOF compete in procuring an agricultural product from farmers. The agricultural product is an 
input in the production process of the two firms and it is combined in fixed proportions with processing 
services to produce the final products of the co-op and the IOF. By focusing on a mixed oligopsony, the 
study pays particular attention to the impact of replacing a profit maximizing IOF with a member welfare- 
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maximizing co-op. The case of a pure oligopsony is also analyzed and is used as a benchmark for 
determining the consequences of cooperative involvement in cost-reducing R&D.  
To analyze the effects of the involvement of marketing co-ops in cost-reducing process 
innovation activity, our study follows the approach developed by G&F when examining the effects of 
input-supplying co-ops. In particular, the strategic interaction between the firms in the pure and the mixed 
duopsonies is modeled as a three-stage sequential game where: in stage 1, the firms compete in (input) 
prices and a new process innovation that can reduce their processing costs is announced; in stage 2, the 
firms determine their optimal level of investment in the new cost-reducing innovation; and in stage 3, 
processing costs are fixed and the firms engage in (input) price competition. In what follows, stage 1 will 
often be referred to as the “pre-innovation stage,” stage 2 as the “innovation stage,” and stage 3 as the 
“post-innovation stage.”  
To capture the geographic nature of agricultural markets (Rogers and Sexton, 1994), we assume 
that, even though the two firms have market power when procuring the agricultural product, they are 
price-takers downstream, i.e., in the markets they sell their processed products. In addition, to account for 
the fact that agricultural products are used as inputs in the production of multiple food products, our 
analysis allows for the final product prices to vary between the two firms, i.e., it allows for the two firms 
to supply different value (quality) markets. 
To avoid Nash equilibria involving non-credible strategies, the different formulations of the game 
are solved using backward induction – the pricing behavior of the firms at the post-innovation stage is 
considered first, the optimal investment in the cost-reducing innovation is analyzed next, and the solution 
to the pre-innovation pricing problem determines the subgame perfect equilibrium amount of cost-reducing 
R&D, the pricing of the agricultural product, and producer decisions in the pre- and post-innovation stages 
of the game.  
In addition to being intuitively appealing, this structure of the strategic interaction in the mixed 
oligopsony enables us to explicitly account for the different objective function of the co-op (member 
welfare maximization vs. profit maximization pursued by IOFs) as well as for the need of the co-op to  
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rely on earnings raised at the pre-innovation stage to finance its subsequent investment in cost-reducing 
innovation. Note that the inability of open membership co-ops to restrict the allocation of benefits from an 
investment activity to those members that have incurred the investment costs (i.e., their inability to 
exclude from the benefits of an investment the members that have not contributed to the financing of this 
investment), creates incentives for opportunistic behavior and free riding that undermine the co-ops’ 
ability to raise investment capital (Vitaliano, 1983; Cook, 1995). A common strategy employed by co-ops 
to cope with this property rights problem is the financing of their investment through retained earnings 
(see Knoeber and Baumer (1983). On the difficulties of open membership co-ops to raise investment 
capital and the role of retained earnings in addressing various property rights problems see also G&F and 
the references therein).  
Other than facilitating the explicit consideration of these important idiosyncrasies of cooperative 
organizations, this structure of strategic interactions makes our results directly comparable to those of 
G&F. Given that both studies consider the market and welfare effects of cooperative involvement in cost-
reducing, process innovation, a comparison of our results will enable us to determine whether the type of 
co-op (input-supply co-op considered in G&F versus the marketing co-op considered here) matters when 
considering the effect of cooperative involvement in process innovation activity. As mentioned 
previously, in addition to being involved in different activities, input supply co-ops differ from marketing 
co-ops in a rather fundamental way – while the input supply co-ops constitute a backward integration of 
their members, marketing co-ops constitute a forward integration of their members. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the producer decisions 
and derives the supplies faced by the duopsonists before and after the process innovation activity. 
Sections 3 and 4 derive the equilibrium conditions in the pure and mixed oligopsonies, respectively. 
Section 5 determines the effect of marketing co-ops on cost-reducing process innovation, the prices 
received by agricultural producers, and the welfare of the groups involved. Section 6 summarizes and 
concludes the paper.    
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2.  Producer Decisions and Welfare 
Before examining the innovation and pricing decisions in the pure and mixed oligopsonies, we need to 
analyze the way farmers make their selling decisions at the pre- and post-innovation stages. By doing so, 
we can derive the supplies faced by each firm and obtain measurements of producer (farmer) welfare 
before and after the cost-reducing process innovation activity.  
In both the pre- and post-innovation stages of the game, farmers have to decide whether to sell 
their product to Firm I or Firm C. Due to differences in their location, commitment to the two firms 
(Fulton and Giannakas, 2001), and/or the prices offered by the two firms, their net returns depend on the 
firm they will deliver their product to. Let  [0,1] α ∈  be the attribute that differentiates agricultural 
producers. The farmer with attribute α has the following net returns function at the pre- and post-




(1)                         If a unit of product is sold to Firm I










Π= − − −
 
where k denotes the stage of the game;  ()
f
Ik Π  and  ()
f
Ck Π  are the per unit net returns when the farm output is 
delivered to Firm I and Firm C, respectively;  () Ik w  and  () Ck w  are the per unit prices paid by Firm I and Firm 
C, respectively; and 
f c  is the farmers’ cost of producing the agricultural product. The parameter t  is non-
negative and captures the degree of producer heterogeneity (when producers differ in their physical location, 
t denotes the transportation cost they face). Ceteris paribus, producers with large values of α prefer to sell 
their product to Firm C, while producers with low values of α prefer selling to Firm I. The greater is t , the 
greater the difference in the net returns associated with selling the farm product to the two firms. 
To ensure positive market shares for the two firms, it is assumed that t  exceeds the difference in 
the prices of the two firms (see equations (3) and (4)), while, to retain tractability, the analysis assumes 
that producers are uniformly distributed between the polar values of α. Each farmer produces a unit of the 
agricultural product and their selling decision is determined by the relationship between  ()
f
Ik Π  and  ()
f
Ck Π .  
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  Figure 1 shows the decisions and welfare of producers. The downward sloping curve shows the 
net returns when the farm product is supplied to Firm I, while the upward sloping curve shows the net 
returns when the product is supplied to Firm C for different values of the differentiating attribute α (i.e., 
for different producers). The intersection of the two net returns curves determines the level of the 
differentiating attribute that corresponds to the indifferent producer. The producer with differentiating 
characteristic  () Ik α  given by: 
() () () () ()
() ()
()
(2)      : (1 )
         
2
ff f f
Ik Ik Ck Ik Ck
Ik Ck
Ik









is indifferent between selling to Firm I or to Firm C as the net returns from selling to the two firms are the 
same. Farmers located to the left of  () Ik α  (i.e., farmers with  () [0, ) Ik α α ∈ ) sell to Firm I while farmers 
with () (, 1 ] Ik α α ∈  sell to Firm C. Aggregate producer welfare is given by the area underneath the effective 
net returns curve shown as the (bold dashed) kinked curve in Figure 1. 
When farmers are uniformly distributed with respect to their differentiating attribute α,  () Ik α  
determines the share of producers delivering their product to Firm I. The share of producers supplying 
Firm C is given by  () 1 Ik α − . By normalizing the mass of producers at unity, these shares give the input 
supplies faced by Firm I,  () Ik x , and Firm C,  () Ck x , at the kth stage of the game, respectively. Formally, 
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After determining the supplies faced by the two firms at the pre- and post-innovation stages, we will now 




3.  Benchmark Case: Innovation and Pricing Decisions in a Pure Oligopsony 
Price Competition at the Post-Innovation Stage (3
rd Stage of the Game) 
In the post-innovation stage of the pure duopsony, the two IOFs seek to determine the input prices that 
maximize their profits holding Nash conjectures (i.e., assuming that their decisions will not affect the 
behavior of their rival).
1 Specifically, the problem of the two IOFs at the 3




(3) (3) (3) (5)     max
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ii i i i
w
p cw x Π= − −  
where { , } iC I ∈ , pi is the price of Firm i’s final product, and  i c  is the post-innovation marginal 
processing cost of Firm i. All other variables are as previously defined.   
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where { , }  and  jC I ij ∈≠ . Solving these best response functions simultaneously and substituting 
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and are a function of the degree of producer heterogeneity, the prices of the products produced by the two 
IOFs, and their post-innovation processing costs. Ceteris paribus, the lower the post-innovation 
processing cost of a firm, the greater its profits at the 3
rd stage of the game.  
 
                                                 




nd Stage of the Game) 
In stage 2, the two IOFs seek to determine their optimal cost-reducing, process innovation effort. The 
relationship between the amount of innovation, r, and the post-innovation marginal costs of processing 
the farm input is given by: 
(3) (1) (9)      iii i cc r β =− 
where  (1) i c  is Firm  's i (strictly positive) marginal cost of processing the farm input at the pre-innovation 
stage of the game, and  0 i r ≥ . The parameter  i β  represents the effectiveness of innovation effort, i.e., the 
degree to which innovation effort is translated into cost reductions for the two rivals. We assume that the 
two firms have the same pre-innovation processing costs (i.e.,  (1) (1) IC ccc = = ) and  i β =1. In addition to 
simplifying our exposition, imposing symmetry on the two firms’ pre-innovation costs and effectiveness 
of innovation effort allows us to focus on the effect of the different objective function of the co-op in the 
mixed duopsony on the equilibrium innovation and pricing decisions.  
While, as indicated by equation (8), innovation effort has the potential to increase the post-
innovation profits of a firm, cost-reducing innovation requires resources. Without loss of generality, 
innovation costs are assumed to be an increasing function of the innovation effort (Shy), i.e.,  
2 1
(10)     
2
ii Ir ψ =  
where ψ is strictly positive scalar reflecting the size of innovation costs. 
  Thus, at the innovation stage of the game each IOF seeks to determine the innovation effort that 
















Π= Π − = −  
From the first order conditions for each IOF’s problem we obtain their best response function as: 
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Solving the best response functions simultaneously, we get the Nash equilibrium levels of innovation for 

















Substituting the equilibrium levels of innovation in the expressions for innovation costs and post-



















Price Competition at the Pre-Innovation Stage (1
st  Stage of the Game) 
In this stage, the two firms seek to determine the input prices that maximize their profits. Since the firms’ 
payoffs in stages 2 and 3 are not dependent on pre-innovation prices or quantities, the objective of the two 
IOFs in stage 1 is to maximize their pre-innovation profits only, i.e.,  
  ( )
(1)




p cw x Π= − −  
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  Table 1 summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium in the pure oligopsony. It can be seen that 
the equilibrium is asymmetric with the differences in input prices, quantities, profits and innovation effort 
being determined by the relative quality of the final products produced by the two IOFs (reflected in the 
relative prices of these products). In particular, the firm with the higher quality product will offer a higher 
price to farmers, will enjoy higher market shares and profits in the 1
st and 3
rd stages of the game, and will 
exert higher innovation effort than its low quality rival.  
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4.  Innovation and Pricing Decisions in a Mixed Oligopsony 
In this case, Firm C is a co-op instead of an IOF. The market structure is, thus, a mixed duopsony 
consisting of an IOF (Firm I) and a co-op (Firm C). 
Price Competition at the Post-Innovation Stage in the Mixed Oligopsony 
Similar to the pure oligopsony case, at the 3
rd stage the IOF seeks to determine the input price that 
maximizes its profits. Thus, both its objective function and its best response function are identical to those 
in the post-innovation stage of the pure duopsony. 
Unlike Firm C in the pure oligopsony, the co-op seeks to identify the input price that maximizes 
the welfare of its members (i.e., farmers that patronize its activities) subject to not incurring economic 
losses. Member welfare is given by the shadowed area  () k MW  in Figure 1 where k=3 and the 
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(19)     max
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MWwc x t x
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=− −
Π≥ = >− − ≥
 
Solving the optimality conditions of the co-op’s problem, shows that the co-op will find it 
optimal to not exercise its oligopsonistic power when procuring the farm product at the post-innovation 
stage (i.e.,  (3) CC C wp c =− ).
2 The Nash equilibrium prices and quantities at the post-innovation stage of 
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2 It should be noted that this will be the optimal pricing strategy of the co-op at the post-innovation stage no matter if 
it seeks to maximize the welfare of all farmers that deliver their product to the co-op at this stage or the welfare of 
only a subset of its post-innovation membership. The obvious reason is that the welfare of any producer group is 
positively related to the farm product prices.     
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Innovation Competition in the Mixed Oligopsony  
In this stage, the two firms seek to determine their optimal innovation effort. Similar to the pure 
oligopsony case, the problem of the IOF is to determine the amount of innovation that maximizes its post-
















Π= Π − = −  
  On the other hand, the problem of the co-op is to maximize the welfare of farmers that are 
members at the time the decision to invest in innovation is being made (this group will be referred to as 
the “pre-innovation membership”). As will be shown below (in stage 1), the pre-innovation membership 
is the group that, by selling to the co-op at reduced prices in the pre-innovation stage, provides the co-op 
with earnings that finance its subsequent cost-reducing innovation effort. Thus, even though the co-op 
knows that its cost-reducing process innovation activity will result in increased input pricing that can 
attract new farmers/members to the co-op at the post-innovation stage, when making its innovation 
decisions the co-op considers only the welfare of farmers that finance its innovation activity (by 
patronizing the co-op in stage 1). 
  Algebraically, the problem of the coop can be expressed as: 
()
'2 2
(2,3) (3/1) (1) (1)
11





CC C C C
r
MWM WI p c r c x t x r ψ =− = − + −− −  
where  (1) C x  is the share of the co-op in stage 1,  (2,3) MW  is the welfare of the pre-innovation membership 
in stages 2 and 3, and 
'
(3/1) MW  is the welfare of the pre-innovation membership in stage 3. Solving the 
problems of the co-op and IOF, we get their best response functions as:  
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The total innovation in the mixed duopsony is then: 
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Price Competition at the Pre-Innovation Stage in the Mixed Oligopsony 
Unlike the pure oligopsony case, in the mixed duopsony the outcome of price competition in the pre-
innovation stage affects firms’ optimal decisions and payoffs in subsequent stages (see equations (31), 
(32), (34) and (35)). Thus, in stage 1 the IOF seeks to determine the input price that maximizes its total 
profits (i.e., its profits at the pre-innovation stage plus its profits at the post-innovation stage minus its 
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  Regarding the co-op, its problem at this stage is to determine the price that maximizes the welfare 
of its pre-innovation membership in both the pre- and post-innovation stages of the game, subject to 
raising earnings that can be retained to finance its cost-reducing innovation in stage 2. The capital 









== and the problem of the co-op 
at the pre-innovation stage can be expressed as: 
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where  (1) MW  is the welfare of the pre-innovation membership in stage 1. The optimality conditions for 
the co-op’s optimization problem suggest that the co-op will find it optimal to choose its price such that 
the investment constraint binds, i.e., the co-op will price its input so that it raises exactly the amount of 

















The Nash equilibrium prices and quantities at the pre-innovation stage of the mixed oligopsony 
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  Substituting the equilibrium pre-innovation membership of the co-op (equation (41)) in equations 
(31)-(33) gives the subgame perfect equilibrium innovation levels in the mixed duopsony. Substituting 
the new expressions of  I r  and  C r  into equations (20)-(26) gives the subgame perfect equilibrium 
conditions in the post-innovation stage of the game.  
Table 2 summarizes the subgame perfect equilibrium in the mixed oligopsony. It can be seen that, 
similar to the pure oligopsony case, the equilibrium is asymmetric with the differences in equilibrium 
conditions being determined by the relative quality of the firms’ final products, the degree of producer 
heterogeneity, and the size of innovation costs. When the co-op is the high quality firm (i.e., when 
I C p p > ), it will offer higher prices to the farmers, will enjoy higher market shares in the pre- and post-
innovation stages, and will undertake higher innovation effort than the low quality IOF.  
Interestingly, because of its objective to maximize member welfare, even when the co-op is the 
low quality firm (i.e., when  I C p p < ) it can still price the farm product above the high quality IOF, enjoy 
higher market shares, and innovate more than its rival. For the high quality IOF to offer higher prices to 
producers and innovate more than the low quality co-op, it should enjoy a significant quality advantage 
relative to the co-op. 
  When the difference in the prices of the products produced by the two firms is 
ψ
ψ 1 3 −
≥ −
t
p p C I , 
the low quality co-op is driven out of the market and the high quality IOF becomes a monopsonist at the 
post-innovation stage of the game (i.e.,  () 0 3 = C x  and  () 1 3 = I x ). Since the co-op exits the market in stage 3, 
it will not invest in cost-reducing innovation in stage 2 and will seek to maximize the welfare of its pre-
innovation membership in stage 1. Table 3 presents the subgame perfect equilibrium for the case where the 
market structure is altered at the post-innovation stage due to the exit of the low quality marketing co-op. 
Finally, when 
3 8








p p I C  it is the co-op that becomes the sole buyer of the farm 
product at the post-innovation stage of the game. Since the IOF exits the market in stage 3, it will not 
invest in cost-reducing innovation in stage 2, and will seek to maximize its pre-innovation profits in stage  
 
15
1. Table 4 presents the subgame perfect equilibrium for the case where the market structure is altered at 
the post-innovation stage due to the exit of the IOF.  
It is interesting to note that it is not necessary for the co-op to produce the higher quality product 
for it to end up being a monopsonist at the post-innovation stage. Indeed, the relationship 
3 8








p p I C  indicates that, for certain (low) values of the degree of producer heterogeneity and 
the size of innovation costs, the presence of the marketing co-op can induce exit of the IOF at the post-
innovation stage even when the co-op produces the lower quality product, i.e., when  I C p p < . 
  
5. The Market and Welfare Effects of Cooperative Involvement in Process Innovation  
Having determined the subgame perfect equilibrium conditions for the pure and mixed oligopsonies, we 
can now examine the ramifications of cooperative involvement for cost-reducing process innovation 
activity, pre- and post-innovation agricultural producer prices, and the welfare of the groups involved. We 
begin by considering the general case of the mixed duopsony at the post-innovation stage of the game. 
  Figure 2 graphs the innovation reaction functions of the firms in the pure and mixed oligopsonies. 
When compared to the reaction function of Firm C in the pure oligopsony ( (2) C RF ), the reaction function 
of the co-op (
'
(2) C RF ) is shifted outwards and rotated rightwards. The co-op has increased incentives to 
innovate because, by seeking to maximize the welfare of its members, it is better able to internalize the 
cost and benefits associated with its process innovation activity.  
  At the same time, the cooperative involvement reduces the marginal profitability of the IOF’s 
investment in innovation by increasing the equilibrium agricultural product prices. Graphically, the 
involvement of the co-op results in the reaction function of Firm I (the IOF in both the mixed and pure 
oligopsonies) shifting inwards in rightward rotation. These changes in the reaction functions result in 
increased innovation by the co-op relative to Firm C in the pure duopsony and reduced innovation by 




'* ' *   and   CC II rr rr ><  
Regarding the total cost-reducing process innovation activity, the effect of cooperative 
involvement depends on the relative quality of the products produced by the marketing co-op and the 
IOF, the size of innovation costs, and the degree of farmer heterogeneity. In particular, the difference 




'* 32 31 6 9
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T r r −  is negatively related to  C p  indicating that the lower is 
the quality of the marketing co-op’s product, the more likely it is that cooperative involvement will result 
in increased total process innovation in this market. When the relative quality of the co-op’s product is the 
lowest (i.e., when  C I p p −  approaches its maximum value of 
ψ
ψ 1 3 − t
 under the co-existence of the two 
firms in stage 3), 
'*   rr ΤΤ > ∀tψ. When  C I p p = , 
'* rr Τ Τ > if 0.701444 tψ > , while, when the relative quality 
of the co-op’s final product is the highest (i.e., when  I C p p −  approaches 
3 8








'* rr ΤΤ >  if 
0.914764 tψ > .  
An interesting implication of these results is that the effect of marketing co-ops on innovation 
activity is more likely to be negative when the co-op is the high quality firm. The reasoning is as follows. 
When the co-op is the high quality firm, it receives a high price for its product and is able to raise more 
capital for innovation activity in stage 1. Increased process innovation by the high quality co-op leads to 
reduced costs and increased farm prices at the post-innovation stage of the game. Since innovation efforts 
are strategic substitutes and the prices offered to farmers are strategic complements, the increased 
innovation effort and prices of the co-op reduce the IOF’s incentive to innovate. The greater the relative 
quality of the co-op’s product, the more likely it is that the increase in co-op’s innovation will be 
outweighed by the reduction in IOF’s innovation and the total innovation activity will be reduced.   
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  Regarding the effects of the degree of producer heterogeneity, t, and the size of innovation costs, 
ψ, on total innovation activity, the analysis shows that the greater is tψ, the more likely it is that the 
mixed oligopsony will result in higher total innovation than the pure oligopsony. The increased likelihood 
that total innovation is greater in the mixed oligopsony under higher innovation costs is the direct 
outcome of the co-op internalizing the effects of its innovation activity to (at least some) farmers. 
  In terms of the effect of the degree of farmer heterogeneity on the total innovation undertaken 
under the pure and mixed oligopsonies, the argument is slightly different. To begin, note that while t does 
not affect the amount of total innovation in the pure oligopsony, it affects the innovation effort of both the 
co-op and the IOF in the mixed oligopsony case. In particular, a high value of t allows the co-op to 
increase its earnings in stage 1 (used to finance its innovation activity in stage 2) without drastically 
reducing the size of its pre-innovation membership. At the same time, a high value of t provides the IOF 
with incentives to increase its innovation effort since, under increased farmer heterogeneity, this firm can 
reduce its price (and increase its profits) at the post-innovation stage of the game. Thus, as farmer 
heterogeneity increases, so does total innovation in the mixed oligopsony. 
Consider next the effect of cooperative involvement on farm product prices. Figure 3 graphs the 
price reaction functions in the pure and mixed oligopsonies and illustrates the changes in equilibrium 
prices caused by the presence of the member welfare maximizing co-op at the pre-innovation stage of the 
game. When compared to Firm C in the pure oligopsony, the co-op’s reaction function (
'
(1) C RF ) is shifted 
outwards in leftward rotation. At the same price, the presence of the co-op causes the reaction function of 
Firm I (IOF in both the pure and mixed oligopsonies) to shift upwards in rightward rotation. The result is 
that both firms in the mixed duopsony pay higher prices to farmers than the IOFs in the pure duopsony. 
Since both prices are increased in the mixed oligopsony, all farmers, members and non-members of the 
co-op, benefit from the presence of the co-op in the pre-innovation stage of the game.  
Figure 4 graphs the post-innovation price reaction functions in the pure and mixed oligopsonies 
and illustrates the changes in equilibrium prices caused by the presence of the member welfare  
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maximizing marketing co-op. When compared to Firm C in the pure oligopsony, the co-op’s reaction 
function (
'
(1) C RF ) is shifted outwards and becomes vertical at  C C c p − (recall that the optimal post-
innovation strategy of the co-op does not depend on the pricing of its rival IOF). At the same time, the 
presence of the co-op causes the reaction function of Firm I to shift outwards in a parallel mode. The 
result is that both firms in the mixed duopsony pay higher prices than the IOFs in the pure duopsony. 
Since both prices are increased in the mixed oligopsony, all farmers, members and non-members of the 
co-op, benefit from the presence of the co-op in the post-innovation stage of the game.  
The effect of cooperative involvement on the welfare of producers in the pre- and post-innovation 
stages of the game is shown in Figure 5. The greater the relative quality of the co-op’s product (i.e., 
CI p p − ), the greater the producer welfare gains from the presence of the marketing co-op. Intriguingly, 
even though total innovation falls with an increase in the relative quality of the marketing co-op, its 
pricing strategy results in agricultural producers benefiting the most when the marketing co-op is a high 
quality firm. Finally, it should be noted that the pricing strategy of the co-op and the reduced price-cost 
margins under a mixed duopsony indicate that the involvement of the marketing co-op in process 
innovation activity enhances competition and, thus, it enhances total economic welfare in this market.  
After analyzing the case where both the co-op and the IOF are in the market in stage 3, consider 
now the case where 
ψ
ψ 1 3 −
≥ −
t
p p C I  and the low quality marketing co-op exits the market at the post-
innovation stage of the game (i.e.,  () 0 3 = C x  and  () 1 3 = I x ; see Table 3). In terms of innovation effort, not 
only does the high quality IOF that ends up being a monopsonist in the 3
rd stage of the game innovate 
more than each individual IOF in the pure duopsony, it undertakes more than the total innovation in the 
pure duopsony. In terms of farm prices, similar to the case when both firms are in the market at the post-
innovation stage of the mixed oligopsony, pre- and post-innovation prices increase in the mixed market 
indicating that the presence of the co-op benefits all producers, members and non-members of the co-op.   
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Consider finally the effects of cooperative involvement when 
3 8








p p I C  and the co-op 
becomes a monopsonist at the post-innovation stage of the game (Table 4). Even though the effect of 
cooperative involvement on total process innovation activity turns out to be, once again, ambiguous 
[







p p I C
−
< ≥ − ], both firms pay higher prices in the mixed oligopsony than their 
counterparts in the pure oligopsony indicating that the presence of the co-op benefits all farmers at the pre-
innovation stage of the game. This is also true for the post-innovation stage since 
'*
(3) (3) CC ww >  and 
'*
(3) (3) CI ww t >+ . Thus, even though the presence of the co-op does not always result in increased innovation, 
the price effect is such that the net returns associated with selling the product to the co-op is greater than the 
net returns associated with selling the product to the two IOFs in the pure oligopsony. Figure 6 depicts both 
the dominance of the co-op in the post-innovation stage and the farmer benefits from its presence.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper analyzed the market and welfare effects of cooperative involvement in cost-reducing, process 
innovation activity. The open-membership marketing co-op considered in the analysis seeks to maximize 
member welfare and addresses its property rights problems by financing its investment activity through 
retained earnings.  
Analytical results show that the involvement of the marketing co-op in cost-reducing process 
innovation is welfare enhancing – the presence of the member welfare maximizing co-op is shown to result 
in increased producer prices and welfare gains for all farmers, members and non-members of the co-op. In 
terms of innovation activity, the effect of the marketing co-op on process innovation was shown to depend 
on the relative quality of the products supplied by the co-op and the IOF, the degree of producer 
heterogeneity, and the size of the innovation costs. Intriguingly, even though total innovation activity can fall 
with an increase in the relative quality of the marketing co-op, the pricing strategy of the member welfare 
maximizing co-op results in agricultural producers benefiting the most when the co-op is a high quality firm.  
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Before concluding this paper it is important to note that our key findings on the effects of the 
involvement of marketing co-ops in process innovation activity are consistent with the results of G&F on 
the effects of input-supplying co-ops. While the nature of innovation activity considered in our study is 
the same as the innovation activity in G&F (both studies focus on process innovation activity), the types 
of cooperative organizations considered in the two studies are different in that marketing co-ops constitute 
a forward integration of their members (i.e., they are formed by groups that are part of the supply side of 
these co-ops), while input-supplying co-ops constitute a backward integration of their members (i.e., they 
are formed by groups who are part of the demand side of these co-ops). An important implication of this 
is that, when considering the effect of cooperative involvement in process innovation activity, the type of 
the co-op does not seem to matter. Regardless of whether they are a backward or a forward integration of 
their members, the involvement of cooperatives in cost-reducing innovation activity can increase the 
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Figure 2. Effect of Cooperative Involvement on Innovation Activity  
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Figure 6.   Market and Welfare Effects of Cooperative Involvement when the Marketing Co-op 
ends up being a Monopsonist at the Post-Innovation Stage  
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Table 2.  Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Mixed Oligopsony 
Pre-innovation 
Stage (Stage 1)  (1) C w   ( )
() ()
22 2 41 2 3 2 8 3 4
41 83










(1) I w   ( )
2 44 34
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(1) I x   ( )
() ()
22 2 84 3 8
41 83
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(3) I w   ( ) ( )
() ()
23 3 2 2 51 8 1 6 1 6 2 3 2 8 1
41 83
CI tt t t t ptt p
c
tt
ψψ ψ ψ ψ ψ
ψψ






























Table 3.  Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Mixed Oligopsony when the IOF is a Monopsonist in 
Stage 3 
Pre-innovation Stage (Stage 1)  (1) C w   C p c −  
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Innovation Stage (Stage 2)  C r   0 
 









Post-innovation Stage (Stage 3)  (3) C w   − 
  (3) I w   C p tc + −  
  (3) C x   0 
  (3) I x   1 
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